Nation or district? Evaluating the territorial scope of bills through experimental designs by Simison, Emilia
www.ssoar.info
Nation or district? Evaluating the territorial scope
of bills through experimental designs
Simison, Emilia
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Simison, E. (2017). Nation or district? Evaluating the territorial scope of bills through experimental designs. Journal of
Politics in Latin America, 9(2), 93-120. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:gbv:18-4-10584
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-ND Lizenz (Namensnennung-
Keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu
den CC-Lizenzen finden Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/3.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY-ND Licence
(Attribution-NoDerivatives). For more Information see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/3.0
Journal of Politics in 
Latin America 
 
 
 
 
 
Simison, Emilia (2017), Nation or District? Evaluating the Territorial Scope of Bills 
through Experimental Designs, in: Journal of Politics in Latin America, 9, 2, 93–
120. 
 
URN: http://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:gbv:18-4-10584 
 
ISSN: 1868-4890 (online), ISSN: 1866-802X (print) 
 
The online version of this article can be found at: <www.jpla.org> 
 
 
 
Published by  
GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Institute of Latin American Studies 
and Hamburg University Press. 
 
The Journal of Politics in Latin America is an Open Access publication.  
It may be read, copied and distributed free of charge according to the conditions of the 
Creative Commons Attribution-No Derivative Works 3.0 License.   
 
To subscribe to the print edition: <ilas@giga-hamburg.de> 
For an e-mail alert please register at: <www.jpla.org> 
 
The Journal of Politics in Latin America is part of the GIGA Journal Family, which also 
includes Africa Spectrum, Journal of Current Chinese Affairs and Journal of Current 
Southeast Asian Affairs: <www.giga-journal-family.org>. 
 
 
  Journal of Politics in Latin America 2/2017: 93–120    
 
Nation or District?  
Evaluating the Territorial Scope of Bills 
through Experimental Designs 
Emilia Simison 
Abstract: This paper studies the territorial scope of the bills presented 
by members of the Chamber of Deputies (the lower chamber of the 
Argentine National Congress) during Juan Domingo Perón’s first two 
terms in office (1946–1955). Its main objective is to observe the effect 
that modifying the electoral system (switching from incomplete party 
ballots in multimember districts to relative majorities in single-member 
districts) had on that scope. Experimental techniques (an interrupted 
time-series and a within-subjects design) are used to analyze a novel 
database including every bill presented in the Chamber of Deputies dur-
ing the period in question. Contrary to theoretical expectations, an in-
crease is observed in the share of bills with a territorial scope that goes 
beyond deputies’ districts – especially for those presented by legislators 
from the opposition and from larger provinces. In addition, by separately 
analyzing the effect on the ruling party and the opposition, the paper 
uncovers a plausible explanation for previous nonconclusive findings. 
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1 Introduction 
During Juan Domingo Peron’s first two terms in office (1946–1955), the 
Argentine electoral system was more dramatically transformed than in 
any other period (De Privitellio 2011: 213).1 Nonetheless, previous anal-
yses of this time frame barely focus on the reforms introduced during 
that period, and even fewer aim to assess their actual effects. In fact, the 
studies that do analyze the constitutional amendment of 1949 (e.g., del 
Barco 1983; Prol 2007; Ajmechet 2009; Negretto 2012) tend to concen-
trate on its objectives and the way in which it was passed rather than the 
effects its profound electoral reforms had. In the handful of works 
where the electoral reforms are the topic of interest, the focus is on the 
extension of the franchise to women and inhabitants of the national 
territories.2 The only exceptions appear to be the works of Sabrina Aj-
mechet (2012) and Luciano De Privitellio (2011), which examine the 
electoral reforms as a whole. However, they examine the political con-
ceptions underpinning the reforms, paying little attention to their actual 
effects. Furthermore, the few papers that analyze the electoral reforms’ 
effects, including the pioneering study by Walter Little (1973), limit their 
attention to electoral results. For instance, they emphasize how the Pe-
ronist Party improved its electoral returns vis-à-vis the opposition and 
the role the reforms played in these gains, but they ignore other ways in 
which these electoral changes may have affected representation. 
In the theoretical and comparative literature on electoral reform we 
find that much has been written about the effects changes in the elec-
toral rules can have on (i) politicians who are more likely to become 
candidates and, in turn, be elected and (ii) the behavior of politicians 
once in office (Carey and Shugart 1995; Norris 2002, 2004; Lundell 2004; 
Cox and McCubbins 2007; Carey 2008; Hazan and Rahat 2010). To date, 
however, the empirical evidence has been inconclusive (see section 3).  
Moreover, even though a lot has been written about Peron’s presi-
dencies, few studies focus on the dynamics of governmental institutions 
during his first two terms – especially in the case of the Argentine Na-
                                                 
1  I would like to thank Sabrina Ajmechet, Alejandro Bonvecchi, Daniel Hidalgo, 
Martin Liby Alonso, Alejandra Mastino, Ana María Mustapic, Gisela Sin, Javier 
Zelaznik, and the two anonymous reviewers for their useful comments and 
suggestions. Any errors or omissions left remain my sole responsibility. 
2  The national territories were political territorial delimitations established in 
those parts of the Argentine national territory where the provinces created dur-
ing colonial times did not have historical control. They were under federal con-
trol and their populations had limited political rights. 
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tional Congress (Engelhardt 2012). Some scattered references can be 
found in research with a more general scope, such as the founding years 
of Peronism (Luna 1972; Ciria 1983; García Sebastiani 2001) or the exer-
cise of opposition by the Unión Cívica Radical (UCR) (Persello 2007). 
But in those references Congress is broadly seen as an arena for interest-
ing, albeit useless, debate or as an opposition tool for political building. 
In any case, it is dismissed as being ultimately controlled by the president 
(Molinelli 1991). Thus, it is still necessary to develop a systematic analysis 
of the legislative branch for the period 1946–1955 that can “rule out the 
impressionism of naïve opinions” (Marysa Navarro cited in Ciria 1983: 
88; author’s own translation). Bárbara Engelhardt (2012) took a first step 
toward this with her descriptive study of Congress during the first years 
of Peron’s presidency (1946–1949), which highlights the role the legisla-
ture played as the origin of relevant laws and the arena in which substan-
tive discussions were held, particularly in the Chamber of Deputies (low-
er chamber).  
Taking this into account, this paper aims at further developing these 
areas of study. Its starting point is the territorial scope of the bills initiat-
ed in the Chamber of Deputies during Peron’s first two terms in office – 
that is, whether the bills were of national, provincial, local, or individual 
relevance. It particularly focuses on how the 1951 electoral reform 
(which replaced the use of incomplete party ballots in multimember 
districts with relative majorities in single-member districts for the elec-
tion of national legislators) may have affected that scope. In order to 
fulfil this goal, I analyze a database containing all bills initiated in the 
Chamber of Deputies from 1946 to 1955. I also make use of, first, the 
literature on the effect of electoral systems on political incentives and, 
second, two experimental designs, which also serve as a useful empirical 
contribution to the former. Using experimental designs to analyze a 
novel dataset of legislative initiatives from the period under study con-
tributes to the literature in at least two ways. First, it permits us to glean 
new information from primary sources that have not yet been systemati-
cally studied. Second, it allows us to carry out controlled analyses – 
which enables us to better evaluate causal relations, thus reducing the 
risk of omitted variable bias – and make analyses simpler and clearer 
(Morton and Williams 2010; Dunning 2012). 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 introduces the 
period under study, focusing on the role of Congress and the electoral 
reforms. Section 3 then reviews the literature on electoral rules and their 
effect on legislative behavior. Section 4 presents the data and methodol-
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ogy used in the empirical analysis, which is presented in section 5. Sec-
tion 6 provides some concluding remarks.  
2 Congress and Electoral Reforms during 
Peron’s First Two Terms in Office 
2.1 Congress 
The national general election was held on 24 February 1946. The coun-
try’s (at that time) 14 provinces and the Federal District of Buenos Aires 
voted for members of the electoral college, who were tasked with select-
ing the president, local executive authorities, and both national and local 
legislators. As had been the case in all democratic elections since the 
enactment of the so-called Saenz Peña Law of 1912, national legislators 
for the Chamber of Deputies were elected by means of incomplete lists 
in multimember districts, which guaranteed that the plurality and the first 
minority in each district was represented.  
The Perón–Quijano ticket won 52.84 percent of the 1946 popular 
vote and 80 percent of the electoral college.3 In Congress only Peronist 
members formed the Senate (upper chamber) as the only two non-
Peronist senators were never incorporated.4 The Peronists also con-
trolled almost 70 percent of the Chamber of Deputies’ 158 seats, while 
the Radicals had 28 percent. This distribution remained virtually un-
changed after the midterm elections in 1948 (Engelhardt 2012). Though 
the Peronist bench had more than two-thirds of the seats, its legislators 
came from different political parties (mainly from the Partido Laborista 
and the Unión Cívica Radical Junta Renovadora) and had little or no 
legislative experience. In contrast, the legislators from the Unión Cívica 
Radical (UCR) had more political and legislative experience (Cantón 
1966); in fact, they frequently criticized the Peronists on account of that 
(MacKinnon 2002).  
During Peron’s first term in office, the opposition was led by the 
so-called Bloque de los 44 – a group of 44 members and chaired by Ri-
cardo Balbín and Arturo Frondizi. In spite of its scant membership with-
in the 158-seat chamber, the faction was considerably active during de-
bates, in the chamber’s committees, and in introducing law proposals. 
The motivation for such activity seems to have been the desire (i) to 
distinguish themselves from other parties by showing “conceptual unity” 
                                                 
3  See online: <http://andytow.com/> (15 June 2017). 
4  Luis Bobbio and Mariano Gómez elected by the Corrientes’ local legislature. 
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and determination to carry out a previously established program, and (ii), 
for the intransigent faction, to which most of the legislators from the 
UCR belonged, to increase its preponderance within the UCR (Luna 
1972; Persello 2007). Faced with this behavior, the Peronist Party 
strengthened its internal discipline in order to cope with an opposition 
that, despite its own divisions, acted in a unified way within the Chamber 
of Deputies (Engelhardt 2012). 
Analyzing Congress in general, Engelhardt (2012) highlights the role 
it played during Peron’s first term in office – at a time when it showed 
vitality and freedom of action – as an arena where many substantive bills 
were presented and discussed and important debates were held. Alt-
hough it consisted only of Peronist members, the Senate did not always 
display unanimity. In fact, Engelhardt shows that (i) the executive only 
introduced 50 percent of the bills considered by Congress during the 
1946–1947 period, (ii) many of those executive initiatives were approved 
only after being amended by legislators, (iii) their consideration was not a 
priority, and (iv) some of those bills were even ignored altogether. Fur-
thermore, as Ana Virginia Persello (2007) states, the debates played an 
important role in enabling the opposition to openly challenge the gov-
ernment and publicize its own ideas. As García Sebastiani (2001) high-
lights, it was the UCR legislators’ activities in Congress that ensured a 
place for the opposition at the national level. 
However, the majority party’s frequent use of parliamentary re-
sources to achieve its goals restricted the ability of the opposition to play 
a substantive role in the legislature. For instance, during Perón’s first 
term, the Peronist Party made use of its majority position to gain control 
over the committees, monopolize the interpretation of the chamber’s 
rules, unilaterally put an end to debates, and declare the opposition depu-
ties “out of the topic” (Engelhardt 2012). Other forms of control, enu-
merated by Ciria (1983), consisted of declaring the Chamber of Deputies 
a committee; modifying the previously set times to end sessions; elimi-
nating the messages accompanying bills so as to prevent them from 
becoming part of session diaries; and warning, suspending, and even 
expelling some UCR legislators.5  
During Peron’s second term, there was a clear and gradual reduc-
tion in the number of noncopartisan legislators: the number of UCR 
legislators was reduced from 44 to 30 in 1950 and down to 12 by 1955 
(Ciria 1983). Nonetheless, it is worth pointing out that this reduction did 
                                                 
5  The last was the case of Ernesto Sammartino, Atilio Cattáneo, Agustín 
Rodríguez Araya, and Ricardo Balbín. 
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not reflect in the opposition’s activity levels. In fact, more than 30 per-
cent of the bills presented in the Chamber of Deputies during the peri-
ods 1946–1947 and 1948–1949 were initiated by UCR legislators. More-
over, even though that figure decreased to 20 percent during the 1950–
1951 period, it reached 30 percent again in the following Congress and 
55 percent in the 1954–1955 period.6  
2.2 Electoral Reform 
The direct precedent of the 1951 electoral reform was the 1948 constitu-
tional reform. As plenty has been written about the constitutional reform 
(e.g., del Barco 1983; Prol 2007; Ajmechet 2009; Negretto 2012), for the 
purposes of this paper, it suffices to review a few issues concerning the 
reasons for it. In a speech on 3 September 1948 Perón argued for such a 
reform, stating the necessity to combine the stability provided by a con-
stitution with the potential for evolution and perfectibility (Sampay 
1975). Other members of the Peronist Party cited the convenience of 
being able to incorporate Peronist philosophy and advancements in 
social rights into the constitution and guarantee them for future genera-
tions. In contrast, the opposition argued that the real purpose of the 
reform was to ensure the reelection of the president (Ajmechet 2009). 
The reform was approved on 27 August 1948 by the Chamber of 
Deputies and five days later by the Senate (Reform Law 13233). Once 
enacted, Decree 29198 set 5 December 1948 as the date for the Constit-
uent Assembly election, in which Peronist candidates won a majority in 
each province and in the Federal District of Buenos Aires. The result 
saw the Constituent Assembly made up of 110 Peronists and 48 mem-
bers of the UCR. After some days of debate, however, the members of 
the UCR decided to retire from the assembly in order to avoid approving 
a reformed constitution they were not in agreement with. Consequently, 
the Peronist Party was the only party that approved the reformed consti-
tution.  
The reformed national constitution made some important changes 
to the electoral system. First, it incorporated the direct election of the 
president, vice president, and senators and permitted reelection for those 
offices (articles 47 and 82). In the case of lower-chamber legislators (who 
were already directly elected), it established the plurality rule, a minimum 
                                                 
6  In any case, the legislative activity in terms of proposals did in fact decrease 
during those years: 2,300 proposals were presented in the lower chamber dur-
ing the 1946–1947 period; 678, during the 1950–1951 period; and less than 290 
during the 1952–1952 and 1954–1955 periods.  
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of two legislators per province (article 42), equivalence between the Sen-
ate and the Chamber of Deputies with regard to office terms (six years 
with partial renewal of the both chambers every three years), and the 
possibility of reelection (article 44). The decision to change the election 
rules for lower-chamber legislators was, as we will see in more detail, 
quite controversial. 
Last but not least, as a consequence of the sixth transitory disposi-
tion, the terms of all the national legislators in office were extended until 
13 April 1952 in order to synchronize the terms of members of the Sen-
ate and the Chamber of Deputies and thus reduce the frequency of na-
tional elections. In protest at the extension, a significant number of UCR 
legislators resigned when their original terms came to an end (Luna 
1972). 
As a corollary to the changes introduced to the electoral system by 
the reformed constitution, Law 140327 was approved on 1 July 1951. It 
established the new national electoral system, condensing all the rules 
concerning the election of national offices and those used in the national 
territories. The most important innovation of this law pertained to the 
election of members of the Chamber of Deputies and required that each 
“small” province (i.e., those with the fewest number of legislators) be 
divided into as many districts as it has seats in the Chamber of Deputies. 
Each “big” province,8 on the other hand, was to be divided into as many 
districts as it had seats minus two. The remaining seats were to be as-
signed to the two runners-up with the highest number of votes.9  
Some of the arguments introduced during the debate of this law10 
are relevant for the topic under discussion here. Ángel José Miel Asquía 
opened the debate in the Chamber of Deputies by defending the pro-
posal on the basis that (i) extant laws and decrees had been updated, 
organized, and made compatible with the new national constitution and 
                                                 
7  Complete text available at <www.boletinoficial.gov.ar/> (15 June 2017). 
8  Buenos Aires, Ciudad de Buenos Aires, Córdoba, Entre Ríos, and Santa Fe. 
9  The original law stipulated that beginning in the first partial renovation, only 
half of the districts would elect a legislator in every election. However, this was 
modified shortly after by Law 14292, which stated that every province should 
be divided into districts according to the number of seats to be appointed on 
that occasion and not according to the total number of seats appointed by the 
province (complete text available at <www.boletinoficial.gov.ar> (15 June 
2017).  
10  I would like to thank María Teresa Tonski from the Departamento de Coordi-
nación de Estudios de la Dirección de Información Parlamentaria de la Hono-
rable Cámara de Diputados de la Nación for providing me with the full trans-
cription of the debate  
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(ii) it gave democratic representation to the national territories. He also 
pointed out that simultaneous national and provincial elections offered a 
way to avoid “constant electoral agitation” (author’s own translation). 
Óscar E. Albrieu made a case for the expansion of single-member dis-
tricts, arguing it was the best way to guarantee equality among voters as it 
balanced the amount of votes needed to elect a single legislator through-
out the national territory. Furthermore, such a system would ensure the 
selection of the most capable candidates in every region of the country, 
facilitate the election of legislators with different social interests, and 
strengthen the relationship between legislators and citizens, thus enhanc-
ing vertical accountability. Vicente Bagnasco added that the new system 
was better because it resulted in the representation of minorities closely 
approximating their electoral strength and was not limited to just one 
minority.  
The opposition, in the voice of Óscar López Serrot, claimed that 
the law was a stimulus to the politics of local strong men. Likewise, Al-
fredo R. Vitolo cast doubt on the constitutionality of a law that did not 
observe the provinces as the only districts and added that such a system 
favored sectoral interests to the detriment of “broad political parties 
capable of channeling the national opinion through general concepts 
with national scope” (author’s own translation). Reynaldo A. Pastor 
highlighted the law’s tendency toward unanimity. In response to this last 
point the Peronist Party decided to incorporate a sort of “insurance” for 
minority representation by allocating two seats from the big provinces to 
the two runners-up with the largest number of votes. 
Lastly, although the Peronist Party–dominated debate in the Senate 
did not add many novel arguments, it did highlight the fact that the new 
system could encourage local development and facilitate the representa-
tion of many separate minorities in the same province.  
3 Electoral Rules and Legislative Behavior 
Legislatures always exhibit some balance between collective and individ-
ual representation. Even though the legislative branch aims at represent-
ing diversity, the electoral rules used for choosing its members impact on 
the dimension through which social diversity can be translated into actu-
al representation (Carey 2008). This leaves room for a trade-off whereby 
reputation-seeking candidates threaten the maintenance of party reputa-
tion (Cox and McCubbins 2007: 113). Given this trade-off, legislative 
elections are likely to generate collective action problems. Those prob-
lems are illustrated by a potential conflict between party members who 
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remain loyal to their districts and the party leadership (Carey and Shugart 
1995). Though they are not the only element at stake, electoral rules play 
a central role in defining which side of the trade-off will be prioritized. 
Formal electoral rules also influence what type of politician is more 
likely to become a candidate and, in turn, be elected. For instance, single-
member districts have been proven to increase the descriptive represen-
tation of underrepresented groups, on the one hand, but have been 
shown to be detrimental to the presence of women in legislatures, on the 
other (King 2002; Trounstine and Valdini 2008). Likewise, the more 
inclusive the “selectorate” (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003), the more 
difficult it seems to be for women and other nonterritorially concentrat-
ed groups to access competitive positions in the candidate lists (Hazan 
and Rahat 2006) – this is beacuse the power to balance the ticket is 
greater in systems where the nomination process is closer (Matland 
1993). District size also seems to affect the ideological-extremism level 
among legislators (Richardson, Russell, and Cooper 2004), while 
selection processes within political parties affect the territorial represent-
ativeness of legislators and their turnover rates (Hazan and Rahat 2006). 
Moreover, electoral rules generate incentives that shape and limit 
political behavior (Norris 2004). Using that idea as a starting point, Pippa 
Norris (2002, 2004) analyzes (i) how the structure of the ballot, and spe-
cially whether it is based on the individual candidate or the party, shapes 
the incentives for the candidates and the electorate and (ii) how this 
modifies the accountability and responsiveness chains that connect legis-
lators with local communities and the party leadership. The underlying 
idea is that the ballot structure influences the behavior of rational politi-
cians by making some activities more relevant than others, both during 
the electoral campaign and once in office. Candidate-orientated ballots 
would encourage a focus on personal rather than partisan aims and are 
more likely to lead to a proliferation of legislators with strong accounta-
bility ties to local communities and who are more responsive to public 
demands than to those of the party leadership. In terms of policy this 
would translate into a preference for the allocation of private benefits 
and local goods. On the contrary, party-oriented ballots would increase 
the incentive to allocate programmatic benefits. John Curtice and Phillips 
Shively (2000) reached similar conclusions, stating that in single-member 
districts the support from a clearly defined group of citizens is needed, 
thus impelling candidates to stand as efficient intermediaries capable of 
dealing with individual and local problems. 
However, the empirical evidence is not yet conclusive. For instance, 
many empirical studies, such as the one by Krister Lundell (2004), do not 
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find any evidence or conclusive indications of candidates developing 
stronger local reputations in single-member districts in established de-
mocracies; though single-member districts do seem to correlate with 
more services to the districts (Norris 2004). Those works that do find 
some evidence of more fluent contact between legislators and citizens in 
single-member districts (see Curtice and Shively 2000) also find strong 
differences between countries. Moreover, even studies that use experi-
mental designs are unable to generate conclusive results. While Jonathan 
Boston et al. (1998) and Amihai Glazer and Marc Robbins (1985) find 
evidence of a change in politicians’ incentives when the district borders 
and/or magnitude change, Bernard Grofman, Robert Griffin, and Greg-
ory Berry (1995) and Scott Desposato (2006) find no evidence of the 
existence of such changes. Likewise, the only study of this kind per-
formed for the Argentine case (Dal Bó and Rossi 2011) finds evidence of 
the impact of institutional changes in Congress but for a different case: 
the lottery-based modification of office terms in 1983 and 2001 and the 
effect thereof on the effort exhibited by legislators.  
One must also keep in mind that regardless of the system used to 
elect legislators, in presidential systems they are more likely to concern 
themselves with local rather than national issues. This is because the 
responsibility to advance a national agenda is set in the executive. In the 
case of Argentina, for example, Alejandro Bonvecchi and Ana María 
Mustapic (2011) reveal that two distinct political agendas existed during 
the country’s democratic period (which began in 1983): a national agen-
da, promoted mainly by the president, and a local agenda, promoted by 
legislators. Another point worth mentioning is that in presidential sys-
tems the executive–legislative dynamic is intertwined with the govern-
ment–opposition cleavage (Mustapic 2000; Jones, Hwang, and Micozzi 
2009). 
4 Data and Methodology 
4.1 Database 
The data used in this paper was compiled from the Chamber of Deputies 
Clerk’s Office journal entries (diarios de Mesa de Entrada) for the period 
between 1946 and the coup of 1955. For the 1946–1950 period, I used 
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data collected by Engelhardt (2012).11 For the 1951–1955 period, I col-
lected data specifically for this research.12  
I only selected bills from all the initiatives presented by legislators 
from the Chamber of Deputies during the period in question. The result 
was a database including 5,712 bills submitted to the Chamber of Depu-
ties between 1946 and 1955. The database was complemented with in-
formation about the legislators who presented those proposals.13  
4.2 Variables 
The dependent variable is the territorial scope of the bills presented in 
the Chamber of Deputies between 1946 and 1955. I followed the classi-
fication proposed by Ernesto Calvo (2007) with only one minor change: 
I replaced the “municipal” category with “local.” As a consequence, the 
categories in this variable were “national,” “provincial,” “local,” and 
“individual.” The “national” category was used when the bill dealt with a 
topic of national scope. This was the case of bill 18-D-1951 – which 
proposed amnesty for political, union, or opinion offenders – and bill 
379-D-1952, which related to the monthly minimum allowance for retir-
ees and pensioners under national programs. The “provincial” category 
was applied to those bills that affected only one particular province or a 
small group of provinces, such as bill 60-D-1951 – which allocated a 
subsidy to the government of Córdoba province so that it could exter-
minate insects that spread infectious diseases – and bill 379-D-1954, 
which set up a toxicological laboratory in Buenos Aires city. The pro-
posals classified as “local” were those whose anticipated impact was 
limited to a territory smaller than a whole province, such as bill 77-D-
1951 – which pursued the expansion and improvement of the Ipizca 
Dam in Catamarca – and bill 169-D-1951, which concerned the building 
of a meat-packing plant in the Rio Negro valley. Bills classified as “indi-
vidual” were those that only affected the individuals or narrow groups 
                                                 
11  I thank Bárbara Engelhardt for providing me with her complete database.  
12  For that task, the assistance of the staff from the Subdirección de Archivo 
Parlamentario of the Dirección de Archivo, Publicaciones y Museo (Honorable 
Cámara de Diputados de la Nación) was invaluable. In particular, I want to 
thank Eduardo Fasanella for authorizing access to the documentation and 
Roberto Sergio Macerati (chief of the department), Andrés Mejías Fernández, 
Néstor Falcon, Roxana Bonanno, Ariel Precedo, Nancy Rosa, Raul Lazcoz, 
Sandra Pintos, Cristian Meinhard, Cesar Sánchez, and Maria Rosales for their 
kindness and assistance.  
13  Both the database and the R scripts used are available on request.  
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involved, such as noncontributory-pension recipients and subsidy-
receiving private entities.14  
The database also includes the main sponsor, the sponsor’s prov-
ince, and the sponsor’s political party for each bill. The decision to in-
clude only the main sponsor was based on a practical motive and a theo-
retical one. The practical reason was that in most of the bills presented 
after 1950 only the main sponsor was registered (followed by the expres-
sion “and others”). The theoretical reason was that, given the purpose of 
the paper, it was deemed more relevant to identify the political party 
than the rest of the personal traits of the legislator. Moreover, virtually 
no proposal was presented by legislators belonging to different political 
parties. The few cases (less than 0.1 percent) for which it was impossible 
to determine the main sponsor of a bill were excluded from the analysis.  
In order to identify the political party of legislators, I used the his-
torical official payroll from the Chamber of Deputies to classify legisla-
tors into three broad groups: the Peronist Party, the UCR, or other mi-
nor parties. In those cases where the party had not been recorded in the 
official payroll, the field was left empty. In addition, a dummy variable 
was used to identify whether legislators came from a big province ac-
cording to Law 14032 (taking the value 1) or otherwise (value 0). Five 
provinces were classified as big provinces: Buenos Aires, Capital Federal, 
Córdoba, Entre Ríos, and Santa Fe. 
Lastly, bills were classified according to the legislative period in 
which they were presented (1946–1947, 1948–1949, 1950–1951, 1952–
1953, and 1954–1955),15 and a dummy variable identified whether a bill’s 
sponsor had been elected for that period by using incomplete party bal-
lots in multimember districts or relative majority in single-member dis-
tricts.  
4.3 Experimental Design 
Jasjeet S. Sekhon (2009: 487) states that “without an experiment, natural 
experiment, a discontinuity, or some other strong design, no amount of 
                                                 
14  Classifying subsidies can be involved because, on some occasions, a subsidy 
given to a narrow group can bring benefits to a broader community. The crite-
rion used meant that bills in which subsidies were allocated for building or re-
pair works whose anticipated impact exceeded the narrow group or allocated to 
municipalities, schools, or public hospitals, were classified as “local” because 
they provided services to the local community.  
15  After the electoral reform, the legislative periods lasted three years; however, 
the division of every two years was kept to allow for the comparison between 
periods. 
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econometric or statistical modeling can make the move from correlation 
to causation persuasive.” Moreover, as Rebecca B. Morton and Kenneth 
C. Williams (2010) highlight, experimental techniques are the best meth-
ods not only for evaluating causal relations but also for assessing the 
impact of an institutional change, as they make it possible to control all 
other variables that could impact that institution’s effects. What is more, 
this control emanates from the same design and not from later adjust-
ments (Dunning 2012), which reduces the probability of omitted variable 
bias and makes the analysis simpler and clearer. 
The available information and the way in which the electoral reform 
was implemented (i.e., by the complete renewal of the Chamber of Dep-
uties) makes it possible to use two types of experimental design in order 
to achieve the paper’s goals: an interrupted time-series analysis (ITS) and 
a within-subjects analysis.  
The first design is based on the observation of a unit in multiple 
points in time and has the objective of assessing “the degree to which a 
treatment shifts the underlying trajectory of an individual’s values for an 
outcome” (Morgan and Winship 2007: 243–244). This required first 
using the observed trajectory of the dependent variable prior to the 
treatment to forecast its future trajectory in the absence of a treatment 
and then comparing it with the actual course followed by the variable 
after the treatment. The underlying idea is a counterfactual definition of 
causality (Dunning 2012), which can be illustrated by the Neyman-Rubin 
model. According to this model, a treatment’s causal effect is defined as 
the difference between the potential decisions of a subject in two differ-
ent states of the world.  
Therefore, in the ITS analysis the Chamber of Deputies is the unit 
of analysis, and its expected and actual trajectories are compared. In 
order to do that, I used the individual trajectories of the different scopes 
and the average scope of the bills. The use of averages was preferred 
because an individual analysis could have resulted in overestimated sig-
nificance levels due to the large number of bills.  
This type of analysis is well suited to this case study because it is 
possible to assert that the treatment (i.e., the system under which legisla-
tors were elected) was assigned in an “as if random” way. In fact, that a 
candidate faced one system or the other was just a temporal issue, most 
likely statistically independent of the rest of the variables likely to affect 
electoral behavior. Furthermore, following the criteria proposed by 
Dunning (2008, 2012), it can be stated that the treatment only affected 
the result by itself as it was the only legal or institutional variable modi-
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fied16 and only had an impact on the legislators who were subjected to it; 
it did not have any effect on those who were elected with the previous 
system. This is because both electoral systems were not in force at the 
same time, and legislators elected by different systems did not share time 
in the Chamber of Deputies. Furthermore, in contrast to many other 
experimental analyses on legislative behavior (e.g., Grofman, Griffin, and 
Berry 1995, Desposato 2006), there is no possibility of self-selection bias 
because all potential candidates should face the same electoral system at 
some point in time given that the change was introduced to the national 
electoral system. For the same reason, there was no room for those as-
signed to the treatment group to avoid treatment, or for those assigned 
to the control group to take the treatment in anyway (Hidalgo 2014). 
Nevertheless, there are two design issues that could affect the analy-
sis results and should thus be considered. The first is the brief period of 
validity of the law, which was a consequence of the 1955 coup d’etat. 
This could be a limitation because, as Norris (2004) states, sometimes 
the effects of legal changes are not visible in the short term. The second 
issue is the aforementioned reduction in the percentage of non-Peronist 
legislators. With this in mind, I decided to additionally perform the anal-
ysis for the Peronist Party and the UCR separately. This methodological 
decision was also grounded in the expectation of finding different behav-
ior between the opposition and the ruling party.  
Another limitation – one that is common to all ITS analyses – is 
that the evolution of the dependent variable prior to the treatment may 
not be a sufficiently good predictor of how it might evolve in the ab-
sence of treatment (Morgan and Winship 2007: 244). Taking this limita-
tion into account, I followed Morgan and Winship’s recommendation 
(who drew on Braga et al. 2001) and thus considered meaningful sub-
groups within the subject. Specifically, I compared the trajectory fol-
lowed by legislators from the big provinces with that followed by legisla-
tors from the small provinces, as the effect of the electoral-law change is 
more likely to be spotted in the former case.  
The second experimental design used is a within-subjects design, in 
which the same individual subjects make choices in multiple states of the 
world (Morton and Williams 2010). In this particular case it is also a 
crossover procedure as those states of the world followed one another 
sequentially (Morton and Williams 2010). The main advantage of this 
design is that it makes it possible to control for both observable and 
                                                 
16  In fact, even though it has not been possible to gather all the ballots used in the 
elections, those which were available have barely changed their style and aspect 
between elections.  
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nonobservable variables given the fact that the same subjects act before 
and after the treatment (Morgan and Winship 2007; Morton and 
Williams 2010). This distinguishes this type of design from techniques 
such as matching, which have a similar aim but assume that the research-
er is aware of all the factors that may affect the dependent variable and, 
moreover, is able to measure them (Dunning 2012). 
To make use of the advantage of this type of design, it was neces-
sary to focus on those legislators that were elected through both electoral 
systems and compares the territorial scope of the bills they presented in 
the two separate states of the world. Given the fact that only three legis-
lators from the UCR fulfilled this requirement, the analysis only includes 
the 24 Peronist legislators who were sequentially elected under the two 
electoral systems. Although this analysis inevitably refers to a much 
smaller number of bills (554), the number of legislators included is not 
so small if we keep in mind that during the period 1932–1976, only 21 
percent of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies were occupied more 
than once by the same legislator (Molinelli, Palanza, and Sin 1999). 
Therefore, the findings from this analysis can be a useful complement to 
the ITS analysis. 
5 Empirical Analysis 
5.1 Interrupted Time-Series Analysis 
Figure 1 shows the trajectory followed by the different scopes along the 
five legislative periods under analysis. For each period, the percentage of 
the total bills classified as having each of the scopes was calculated and 
different plots were made in which the trajectory followed by each of the 
scopes is shown. In addition, two linear adjustments were added, depict-
ing the actual trajectory followed by the scope (gray) and the predicted 
trajectory if no change in the electoral system had occurred (black) (i.e., 
if no treatment was applied).  
The first thing to notice in Figure 1 is that the effect of the elec-
toral-system change runs contrary to what was theoretically expected. In 
fact, without such a change, the percentage of bills with a national scope 
would have been almost 10 points less than it actually was. Even though 
the difference is less evident, this also seems to be the case with bills 
with a provincial scope. In contrast, the percentage of bills with both a 
local and an individual scope was reduced as an effect of the change in 
the electoral system. This is particularly clear for those bills with an indi-
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vidual scope, where an otherwise upward tendency was reverted after the 
change in the electoral system. 
Figure 1. Scope Trajectories 
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Source:  Author’s own elaboration with data from journal entries made by the Clerk’s 
Office (diarios de Mesa de Entrada) of the Chamber of Deputies. 
Figure 2 shows a similar trend. This plots the trajectory followed by the 
average scope of all the bills introduced in the Chamber of Deputies in 
each period. An average of one means that all the bills were national in 
scope, while an average of four would imply that all the bills were indi-
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vidual in scope. As can be readily appreciated, although the average 
changed from year to year during the three legislative periods under the 
former electoral system, the variation was always in the range 2.5–3, thus 
indicating a moderate tendency towards legislation with a narrower 
scope. Using those averages, the expected trajectory also continues with-
in that range of values. In contrast, the average decreased after the elec-
toral reform, indicating that more weight was given to bills with provin-
cial or national scope.  
Figure 2. Average Scope Trajectories 
 
 
Source:  Author’s own elaboration with data from journal entries made by the Clerk’s 
Office (diarios de Mesa de Entrada) of the Chamber of Deputies. 
As already stated, in order to further check these results, the analysis was 
performed with a meaningful subgroup. The theoretical expectation is 
that if the change in the electoral system had any effect, it would have 
been stronger in the big provinces. The reason for this is that citizens in 
big provinces, who were used to electing a high number of legislators, 
were asked to elect only one. Such a change may have affected the prior 
knowledge they had of the candidates they were voting for. As theoreti-
cally expected and illustrated in Figure 3, the effect of the electoral re-
form (represented by a decrease in the scope’s average) is evident in the 
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bills introduced by legislators from big provinces and not in those intro-
duced by legislators from small provinces.  
Figure 3. Average Scope Trajectories for Big and Small Provinces 
 
Source:  Author’s own elaboration with data from journal entries made by the Clerk’s 
Office (diarios de Mesa de Entrada) of the Chamber of Deputies. 
As it was likely that the behavior of those legislators from the Peronist 
Party and the UCR differed, separate trajectories were estimated for both 
groups (see Figure 4). As shown, the effect of the electoral reform seems 
to have been concentrated on UCR legislators. Although there is a slight 
decrease in the average for Peronist legislators, the expected trajectory 
without the change in the electoral system hardly differs from the actual 
trajectory. However, the electoral reform seems to have had a strong 
impact on the scope of the bills introduced by UCR legislators. In fact, 
before the reform, the average scope of the bills they presented was 
around 2.5; after the reform, less than 2. A possible explanation is that as 
a smaller minority, it was virtually impossible that their bills would actu-
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ally become law and that, in such a context, introducing legislation with a 
broader scope was deemed a better credit-claiming strategy. Besides, 
since the Peronist Party was in charge of defining district borders, actual 
district boundaries and their stability over time were likely a matter of 
uncertainty for the UCR. So instead of legislating for the constituency 
they were elected by – expecting it to stay unchanged – it was a much 
safer option to invest in a broader population.  
Figure 4. Average Scope Trajectories for Peronist and UCR Legislators 
 
Source:  Author’s own elaboration with data from journal entries made by the Clerk’s 
Office (diarios de Mesa de Entrada) of the Chamber of Deputies. 
5.2 Within-Subjects Analysis 
The second experimental technique used was a within-subjects analysis. 
It only considered those bills introduced by the Peronist legislators elect-
ed under both electoral systems. As is visible in Figure 5, this subgroup 
seemingly behaved differently from the Chamber of Deputies as a whole. 
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In fact, the actual trajectories of the different scopes show fewer national 
and provincial bills than expected and an increase in the percentage of 
those with a local or individual scope.  
Figure 5. Scope Trajectories (Legislators in Both Systems Only) 
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Source:  Author’s own elaboration with data from journal entries made by the Clerk’s 
Office (diarios de Mesa de Entrada) of the Chamber of Deputies. 
This tendency is also evident in Figure 6, as the average scope increases 
significantly after the electoral reform. This is consistent with the finding 
from the ITS analysis, which shows that the decrease in the average 
scope was mainly driven by UCR legislators. Another interesting feature 
about this subgroup is the trajectory followed by the percentage of bills 
with an individual scope. This percentage not only increased constantly 
across periods but was also significantly higher in this subgroup. This 
  Evaluating the Territorial Scope of Bills 115
 

 
finding – although not the main goal of this paper – might indicate that 
the allocation of particularistic goods makes the reelection of legislators 
more likely.  
Figure 6. Average Scope Trajectories (Legislators in Both Systems Only) 
 
Source:  Author’s own elaboration with data from journal entries made by the Clerk’s 
Office (diarios de Mesa de Entrada) of the Chamber of Deputies. 
6 Concluding Remarks 
The goal of the paper was to analyze the territorial scope of the bills 
introduced by legislators in the Chamber of Deputies during Peron’s first 
two terms in office. In particular, it focused on the effect the reform of 
the electoral system may have had on that scope. Therefore, it contrib-
utes to the study of two scarcely analyzed aspects of Peronism – namely, 
the dynamics inside Congress and the effect of electoral reforms on 
policy – as well as to the broader literature on electoral systems. In order 
to achieve this aim, I reviewed the literature on the subject and used two 
experimental techniques (an ITS analysis and a within-subjects analysis).  
Contrary to what was theoretically expected, the findings show that 
after the introduction of single-member districts, there was an increase in 
the proportion of bills that had broader scopes. As expected, this effect 
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was relevant in big provinces but not in small districts, thus reinforcing 
the causal claim of the analysis of the bills as a whole.  
A potential explanation for these counterintuitive findings is the dif-
ference in behavior between Peronist and UCR legislators. In fact, when 
the analysis is performed separately for both groups, the increase in the 
share of national and provincial laws is observed only for legislators from 
the opposition. Further analysis would be needed in order to make any 
conclusive arguments, but this may indicate that the change in the elec-
toral system had an effect contrary to that theoretically expected because 
the observed effect is not a consequence of the reform per se but of its 
effect on the proportion of legislators from the opposition and the way it 
was implemented. As for the first point, given that the reform imple-
mented a harsh reduction in the share of opposition legislators in Con-
gress – which was controlled by the government party – UCR legislators 
could not depend on the allocation of individual or local goods to their 
constituencies for credit claiming. In such a context, it is possible that 
the best strategy for those legislators was to introduce broad-scope bills 
that could be used for credit claiming in a partisan or symbolic fashion, 
even if they had virtually no chance of being enacted. As for the way in 
which the reform was implemented, it is likely that district borders re-
mained a source of uncertainty for UCR legislators, thus making it a 
safer strategy to invest in broader populations. Such uncertainty derived 
not only from the fact that the Peronist Party had the power to define 
those borders but also from the fact that the law was modified shortly 
after its enactment, thus contradicting the law’s semblance of stability.  
Furthermore, the fact that the within-subjects analysis found no in-
crease in the share of national bills reinforces the hypothesis proposed to 
explain the theoretically unexpected findings. Furthermore, the high and 
steadily increasing proportion of bills with an individual scope intro-
duced by Peronist legislators elected under both electoral systems may 
indicate the importance of this kind of legislation with regard to the 
probability of reelection. The underlying logic here is that the behavior 
or the characteristics of reelected candidates differ from those of other 
Congress members, especially in countries with low reelection rates. 
Finally, the use of experimental techniques to analyze a novel da-
taset on legislative initiatives contributes to our understanding of the 
effect changes in electoral systems have on policy, above all on its terri-
torial scope. In particular, they highlight differences in behavior between 
the governing party and the opposition as well as the presence of inter-
vening effects as the likely sources of previously nonconclusive findings.  
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¿Nación o distrito? Evaluando el alcance territorial de los proyec-
tos de ley con técnicas experimentales 
Resumen: El artículo estudia el alcance territorial de los proyectos de ley 
presentados por los miembros de la Cámara de Diputados durante las 
dos primeras presidencias de Juan Domingo Perón (1946–1955). Su 
objetivo principal es observar el efecto que la modificación del sistema 
electoral (de boletas partidarias con lista incompleta en distritos plurino-
minales a distritos uninominales con mayoría simple) tuvo en dicho al-
cance. Técnicas experimentales (interrupted time-series y within-subjects design) 
se utilizaron para analizar una base de datos inédita que incluye todos los 
proyectos de ley presentados por diputados durante el período bajo es-
tudio. Contrario a lo teóricamente esperado, se observa un aumento de la 
proporción de proyectos con alcance territorial más amplio que el distri-
to del legislador – especialmente en los proyectos presentados por legis-
ladores opositores y de provincias grandes. Además, analizando separa-
damente el efecto de la reforma en diputados oficialistas y opositores, el 
artículo señala una posible explicación para hallazgos previos no conclu-
yentes.  
Palabras clave: Argentina, comportamiento legislativo, alcance territo-
rial, sistema electoral, técnicas experimentales 
